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Summary: This essay examines the divergence in views and actions between the two 
leading Serbian statesmen, Nikola Pašić and Milovan Milovanović, during the course 
of negotiations with Bulgaria which led to the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian 
alliance, a prerequisite for the successful military operations against the Turks in the 
Balkan War of 1912. Milovanović, the foreign minister, considered an agreement 
with Bulgaria as an indispensable diplomatic asset for Serbia which would allow her 
to preserve her independence in the face of the hostile Austria-Hungary and secure 
an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Although he fully appreciated the difficulties of Serbia’s 
position pointed out by Milovanović, Pašić was rather unbending in respect of the 
territorial concessions to Bulgarians in Macedonia to which Serbia had to agree in re-
turn for the conclusion of an alliance. This essay demonstrates that the difference be-
tween Pašić and Milovanović was a matter of tactics rather than principle. The former 
realised that the price had to be paid for the Bulgarian alliance but preferred to have 
the Serbian government accept an unfavourable borderline under duress, because of 
the arbitration of Russian Emperor, rather than on its own volition. Not willing to 
take the responsibility for the concessions made in Macedonia, Pašić chose to present 
formal rather than real opposition to his party colleague. It was Milovanović’s dip-
lomatic elasticity and courage that enabled the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement to come 
into being.  
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The light is not sufficiently shed on the last year of Milovan Milovanović’s life. In particular, his relations with Pašić during the course of negotia-
tions for the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance remain unexamined. The 
contradictions in their mutual relations have already been noted:1 Pašić 
distanced himself from Milovanović during the negotiations, he disagreed 
with his conduct, but did not prevent him from the conclusion of an agree-
ment, maintaining a reserved attitude throughout, until the outbreak of the 
Balkan War. Therefore, in order to better understand not just the history of 
the Balkan Alliance, but also later events, especially the Second Balkan War 
of 1913, it is of interest for our political and diplomatic history to analyse 
what Pašić and Milovanović disagreed on and how their disagreement af-
fected the negotiations with Bulgaria.
1 Slobodan Jovanović, “Milovan Dj. Milovanović”, Srpski književni glasnik LI (1937). 
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I
To analyse the workings of Pašić and Milovanović in 1912, it is necessary 
to find out what was their general outlook on the question of agreement 
and alliance with Bulgaria. They did not differ on that point at all — both 
of them saw an agreement with Bulgaria as a basis of political programme.2 
There was no difference in principle. Differences emerged in the matters of 
practical politics: What kind of an alliance Serbia needed? To what extent 
should Serbia meet Bulgaria’s requirements? To put it simple, was an alli-
ance necessary at any cost?
Milovanović’s political programme contained two parts, negative 
and positive. The former concerned the suppression of Austro-Hungarian 
penetration in the Balkan Peninsula relying on the support of Russia and 
Western Powers, that is to say on that political grouping in Europe which 
accepted the principle “Balkan for the Balkan peoples”. The positive part 
of his programme concerned a rapprochement and agreement between the 
Balkan states, particularly between Serbia and Bulgaria. Both parts of the 
programme were mutually compatible. The negative part was not sufficient 
in itself because Austria-Hungary, even if halted in its penetration, was still 
strong enough to paralyse Serbia’s development. On the other hand, with-
out the positive part of the programme — a Balkan agreement — Bulgaria 
might have realised her own pretensions without and even against Serbia.
Pašić accepted Milovanović’s programme, just like the majority of 
politicians in Serbia. The first disagreement between them emerged in con-
nection with the presumption that the positive part — an alliance with 
2 Politicians in Serbia were nearly unanimous in their assessment of the necessity of an 
agreement with Bulgaria. The Radicals, Aca Stanojević, Ljuba Jovanović, Lazar Paču, 
Stojan Protić took a favourable view of the agreement notwithstanding their reser-
vations towards Milovanović personally. The Independent Radicals, Ljuba Stojanović, 
Jovan Žujović, Ljuba Davidović, Milorad Drašković, Jaša Prodanović often supported 
Milovanović more than Radicals themselves. The Progressives, the Marinković brothers, 
did away with the old Austrophile policy of their party and sought for an agreement 
with Russia which implied the necessity of a Balkan alliance. Stojan Novaković, the 
Prime Minister at the time of the Annexation Crisis in 1908, had personally laboured 
for a rapprochement with Bulgaria, although he had much doubted the likelihood of 
an agreement. The Liberals alone stood aloof. Public opinion, university professors and 
Serbian intelligentsia ( Jovan Cvijić, Draža Marković, Stojan Stojanović, Aleksandar 
Belić) approved of an agreement with Bulgaria as well. The extreme nationalists — Apis 
and his friends from the Black Hand organisation — collaborated with Milovanović at 
the time of the negotiations. See Jovan M. Jovanović, “Milovan Dj. Milovanović and the 
Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance of 1912”, Politika, 13 March 1932; Andrei Toshev, Balkanskite 
voini, I (Sofia, 1929), 236; Jovan M. Jovanović, “Novaković u diplomatiji”, in Spomenica 
Stojana Novakovića (Belgrade: Srpska kniževna zadruga XXIII, 1921), 164, 212.  
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Bulgaria — proved impossible to achieve. Milovanović approached the Ser-
bian question viewing it from Balkan and Central European aspect. It was 
not just the question of emancipation of the Serbian people in the Balkans, 
but also, due to geographic position and political circumstances in the wake 
of the Berlin Congress, an internal and external issue of Austria-Hungary 
which indirectly involved it into Central European problems. Milovanović 
came to conclusion that Serbia had to, in the name of Balkan emancipa-
tion, spearhead the resistance to Austria-Hungary or, if that was impossible, 
submit herself to the Central European political system and become its 
avant-garde in the Balkan Peninsula.3     
For the purpose of his political orientation, Milovanović paid most 
attention to the attitude of two capitals: Vienna and Sofia. He feared Aus-
tro-Hungarian attempts to divide the Balkans with Bulgaria. Milovanović 
felt that in such division Vienna would cheat both Serbia and Russia, and 
finally Bulgaria. It depended on Sofia’s attitude towards tempting offers 
from Vienna whether Balkan matters would be primarily solved by Balkan 
states or Great Powers, and Austria-Hungary in particular. The former solu-
tion was possible provided Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was concluded; the 
latter would be the consequence of a failure to come to terms and would 
be fatal for Serbia’s independence.4 Therefore, Milovanović conducted his 
policy under the motto: either in Skoplje with Bulgaria or in Salonica with 
Austria-Hungary! Milovanović claimed that Serbia needed Bulgaria against 
Austria-Hungary and Austria-Hungary against Bulgaria.5 In other words, 
Serbia’s independence, threatened by the Dual Monarchy, could be saved 
only by an agreement with Bulgaria for the purpose of common defence. 
If such development was impossible, and Serbia was forced to sacrifice her 
independence, that loss would be compensated by territorial gains in the 
south, in Macedonia.
These Milovanović’s conceptions further emphasised their positive 
part after the Annexation Crisis — although they did not undergo essential 
changes. In the wake of the annexation, Milovanović was increasingly pes-
simistic about the possibility of coming to terms with Austria-Hungary. 
From 1909 onwards, as the Bulgarian Minister at Belgrade, Toshev, stated, a 
Serbo-Bulgarian agreement became a fixed idea for him. Choosing between 
two alternatives — with Austria-Hungary or Bulgaria - Milovanović deci-
sively opted for the latter. All his diplomatic activities in 1909–1912 — a rap-
prochement with Austria-Hungary and trade negotiations — were mostly 
3 Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia; herafter AS], Milovan Milovanović Papers, 
XXVI/13.
4 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXX/155.  
5 Ibid. XXX/157.
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tactical manoeuvring in order to bring Bulgaria closer to Serbia and prepare 
the ground for negotiations. He focused on negotiations with Bulgaria; he 
approached them as a drowning man clutching at a straw. Milovanović was 
intent on concluding an agreement with Bulgaria at any cost.6 
In comparison with this main goal, Milovanović found everything 
else of less importance. The partition of Macedonia which was the central 
issue of an agreement with Bulgaria was thus of secondary importance. In 
Milovanović’s view, an agreement with Bulgaria was rather the means of de-
fence from Austria-Hungary than leverage for penetration into Macedonia. 
By virtue of his vocation and intellect Milovanović was a diplomat who as-
sessed the position of Serbia in the context of European and Balkan powers. 
He was not himself concerned with the matters pertaining to Macedonia 
in the way that other Radicals such as Sveta Simić, Ljuba Jovanović and 
Pašić were. Milovanović was convinced that the Macedonian nationality 
did not exist and that formation of it would be harmful; neither Serbs nor 
Bulgarians should stand as separate nations — therefore, an autonomous 
Macedonia would be an artificial and temporary solution. He regarded such 
a solution, in the aftermath of the events in Eastern Rumelia, as a first step 
towards unification with Bulgaria. In his view, “the state reason”, i.e. life and 
rational necessities of Balkan states were crucial in the liquidation of Ot-
toman heritage.7 He was deeply convinced that it was impossible to deter-
mine any real demarcation line in Macedonia, just like it was “impossible to 
determine a point of division between two similar colours which gradually 
spill and merge one in another”. He also found arbitrary the extant Serbo-
Bulgarian state border “as any other border drawn to the left or to the right 
would be arbitrary”.8 Milovanović was thus always willing to make conces-
sions in his negotiations with Bulgaria. At the beginning of the negotiations 
6 On 19 January 1912, Milovanović recorded: “We, Serbia, desirous of surviving as an 
independent state and forging our future as an independent state in a community with 
other Balkan states must firstly do all in our power to reach an agreement with Bulgaria 
which can only be done with consent and protection of Russia. If that turns out to be 
entirely impossible, our only path will remain — in the embrace of Austria-Hungary. 
And that solution might be definite and consequently faithful for the entire Balkan 
Peninsula”. See AS, Milovanović Papers, X/1. 
7 Milovanović had stressed this thought at the time he had been a Minister in Rome. 
In his telegram of 28 January/10 February 1904 [the first date is given according to the 
Julian calendar which was in use in Serbia until 1919], he wrote that an agreement with 
Bulgaria must be reached “not for the sake of solving the Macedonian question, but 
with a view to staying exclusively on the practical grounds of defence of the common 
and general Balkan interests against a foreigner”. Quoted in Vladimir Ćorović, Odnosi 
izmedju Srbije i Austrougarske u XX veku (Belgrade 1936), 55.  
8 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/22–23; XXX/159. 
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in 1909 he considered the frontiers encompassing Skoplje, Veles, Prilep i 
Ohrid to be conditio sine qua non and eventually, at the end of the negotia-
tions, he renounced the latter three towns. 
Milovanović’s chief objective was an outlet to the Adriatic Sea and 
for that reason he endeavoured to close the road towards the south for Aus-
tria-Hungary; the borderline he requested in Macedonia was something of 
a strategic security for the communication leading to the sea. 
Such a stance on the part of Milovanović was rooted in his profound 
suspicion that the Habsburg Monarchy was soon going to collapse. Always 
an exponent of rationalism and utilitarianism in politics, Milovanović dis-
counted the assumptions based on wishful thinking and hopes. Much im-
pressed by the Habsburg Monarchy’s determination during the Annexation 
Crisis, Milovanović did not believe that Serbia could considerably contrib-
ute to and play an important role in the break-up of the Dual Monarchy 
on her own. Conservative to the core, he could not easily adapt to such far-
reaching and revolutionary assumptions. Even if the break-up came to pass, 
Milovanović wondered, what would Serbia gain? Russia would get hold of 
the Galician Ruthenes and had a decisive influence in the Czech lands and 
Poland; Germany would descend on Trieste; the Balkan states and small 
nations would be smothered between Germany and Russia.9 
The disagreement between Milovanović and Pašić lay in their dif-
fering views on the Serbian goals in Macedonia and the future of Austria-
Hungary. Accepting the programme carried out by Milovanović as minister 
for foreign affairs (1908–1911) and prime minister (1911–1912), Pašić fol-
lowed it up to a certain point. Milovanović’s premises about the necessity 
of conforming Serbian programme to Austria-Hungary in case of a failure 
to come to an understanding with Bulgaria were the result of an intellec-
tual speculation which sought for solution in all situations but did not take 
into account the mood of Serbian political circles and common people. An 
anti-German wave which had swept Serbia, particularly from the time of 
the Annexation Crisis onwards, was so strong that it would no doubt dis-
allow any such policy. Pašić felt this current much deeper and better than 
Milovanović who was more given to theoretical musing. In Milovanović’s 
chess game only men — Great Powers -were visible whereas Pašić took 
account of pawns too. In respect of Austria-Hungary’s future Pašić did not 
share Milovanović’s opinion that its break-up was a matter of distant ho-
rizons.10 Just in the rare moments of angriness Pašić would threaten, for 
example to Italy, that the Serbs would prefer an Austro-Hungarian yoke, 
9 Ibid. XV/1, a note written in Berlin, 7/20 October 1909. 
10 Karlo Sforca, Nikola Pašić i ujedinjenje Jugoslovena: ratne i diplomatske uspomene (Bel-
grade 1937), 106. 
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together with their Slav brethren, than consent to domination on the part 
of any other power. Indeed, he was averse to such combination much more 
than Milovanović and used it rather as the means of a political blackmail. For 
that reason, Pašić did not make such a close connection between the positive 
and negative part of the Serbian foreign policy programme as Milovanović 
did, and he did not attach to alliance with Bulgaria the absolute importance 
of a salvation for Serbian diplomacy. As for Pašić, contrary to Milovanović, 
an alliance with Bulgaria was not just a defensive tool against the Dual 
Monarchy, but also, if not more so, a tool for penetration in the south, in 
Macedonia. In his estimation of benefits that Serbia could derive from such 
an agreement Pašić had two criteria, defensive and offensive, and he set his 
course depending on their mutual relationship. The gains that Milovanović 
wanted to achieve in the west, in the direction of the Adriatic Sea, were 
not sufficient compensation, in Pašić’s view, for the territorial concessions 
to Bulgarians in Macedonia.  In 1912, Pašić took the same line as in the 
Annexation Crisis of 1908: he refused a compromise which, in his opinion, 
infringed on the Serbian national programme. For the same reasons, he 
would prove to be “intransigent” in 1915 when he resisted the pressure from 
the Allies in a truly desperate moment.11
Both Milovanović and Pašić saw an alliance with Bulgaria as a defen-
sive means against Austria-Hungary. In order to win over Bulgarian support, 
Milovanović was prepared to make concessions. Far more distrustful, Pašić 
doubted much more that assistance from Sofia would be forthcoming. In 
his eyes, the dilemma was whether one should pay too high a price in return 
for an uncertain assistance. A European with broad horizons, Milovanović 
could not understand bargaining. This procedé was alien to him and he took 
it as an unpleasant necessity. Contrary to him, Pašić, a typical politician of a 
Turco-Byzantine style, knew how to bargain. As much as Milovanović did 
not have the strength and nerves to engage in such a trading striving to ac-
complish his objective in the negotiations with Bulgaria, Pašić was perfectly 
willing to haggle over a last village as he would do over a capital city. 
II 
The Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations for the conclusion of an alliance could be 
divided into two phases: the first one took place in 1909–1911 — it started 
in the midst of the Annexation Crisis and reached the Tripolitania War. 
The second phase began in the fall of 1911 and it was ended with the suc-
cessful conclusion of the treaty. The first phase was characterised by uncer-
11 A dramatic account is given in Spomenica Ljubomira Davidovića (Belgrade 1940), 
107–108. 
D. Djordjević, Pašić and Milovanović in the Negotiations 301
tainty, Milovanović’s constant attempts to break the deadlock, the sounding 
and preparing the ground in Europe and Sofia’s indecisiveness. The second 
phase was marked by serious efforts and negotiations which gradually led 
towards the successful outcome. 
The first phase was rather general in nature and both Milovanović 
and Pašić acted in unison. That was beyond any dispute. As foreign minis-
ter, Milovanović had the initiative which was fully supported by Pašić. In 
this harmony, it should be noted that Milovanović was intent on pushing 
Pašić in the background — and that for personal reasons. On the occasion 
of the Bulgarian King Ferdinand’s visit to Belgrade in November 1909, 
Milovanović entirely preoccupied the guest at a tea party at which King Petar 
and Pašić were also present. “He talked to me much longer than [he talked 
to] them,” Milovanović noted, “the conversation was conducted almost en-
tirely between the two of us”.12 The jealousy between Pašić and Milovanović 
was also visible in the relations with Russia. The latter constantly overshad-
owed the former during the conversations in St. Petersburg in 1910 when 
both Serbian statesmen tried to further involve Russia in Serbo-Bulgarian 
relations. Much better orator than Pašić, striking and well-mannered in sa-
lons, a man of “high society”, Milovanović overshone his prime minister on 
such occasions. Giving account of his conversation with Izvolsky who was 
intellectually akin to him, Milovanović recorded with the greatest satisfac-
tion: “It was mostly I who kept conversation going in French. From time to 
time Izvolsky explained to Pašić in Russian the subject of conversation and 
Pašić then expressed his agreement or, if Izvolsky would ask for his opinion, 
after having asked the same question to me, he would answer vaguely and 
with incomplete phrases”.13  
Pašić must have found his position rather unpleasant, but he endured 
it maintaining his reserved attitude. His caution probably stemmed from 
the Russian stance which neither he nor Milovanović could entirely deci-
pher. Russian official diplomacy pressed forward the idea of a Serbo-Bul-
garian rapprochement at that time, but it was reluctant to meet the request 
of the Serbian government and put pressure to bear on Sofia in the matter 
of partition of Macedonia. In March 1910, Izvolsky openly stated to both 
Pašić and Milovanović that he did not approve of the San Stefano treaty, 
but that treaty remained purely Russian creation and he was unable to get 
rid of it that easily. Izvolsky suggested the middle course — that the San 
Stefano treaty in principle remained “the basis of Russia’s Balkan policy” 
but that it should undergo certain modifications “in order to meet Serbian 
interests and rights which were forgotten and infringed on at the time of its 
12 AS, Milovanović Papers, XVIII/5, 9. 
13 Ibid. XVI/23.
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making”.14 The Russian minister for foreign affairs pointed out the motto 
for relations with Bulgaria: glisser et non appuyer — because the truth that 
had to be told the Bulgarians was bitter. While Milovanović was satisfied 
with this outcome believing that the ice was broken, Pašić paid more atten-
tion to the geographic map that he and Milovanović had given to Izvolsky 
with marked Serbian territorial demands in the south.
The same difference emerged in the conversations with the Bulgarian 
minister Toshev in Belgrade in the spring of 1911. Milovanović stressed the 
necessity of a rapprochement in principle, on a broad basis, whereas Pašić 
said the same but he added the borderline Bregalnica-Ohrid.15
The second phase of negotiations, which started in the fall of 1911 
and centred on the delimitation in Macedonia, brought about the first and 
real disagreement between Pašić and Milovanović. The arrival of Rizov in 
Belgrade in September 1911 opened serious conversations. It should be 
noted that Rizov addressed Pašić first although the latter had no portfolio 
in the government at that time and then Milovanović; the Bulgarian gov-
ernment seems to have known that Pašić’s consent was prerequisite. Rizov 
brought the first concession from Sofia — the proposal of a borderline 
along the frontier of the Skoplje sanjak, stretching southwards from the 
Šar mountain. Milovanović rejoiced on account of the change in Bulgarian 
opinion which had until then stood on the ground of indivisibility of Mace-
donia. He saw the abandonment of that principle as a victory of the idea 
of agreement. He was prepared to make concessions in order to strengthen 
that idea. Pašić also welcomed this step, but he met the Bulgarian frontier 
proposal with his own — from the Bregalnica river to Struma which gave 
Serbia, along with Skoplje, Veles, Prilep, Kičevo and Poreč. Milovanović 
14 Izvolsky asked Milovanović for his assistance in the drafting of a “formula” which 
he could put forward to the Bulgarian government. On 11 March 1910, Milovanović 
handed him the following proposal for the modification of the San Stefano treaty: “De 
donner une juste et large satisfaction aux droits nationaux et historiques de la Serbie sur 
les territories au sud de Katchanik et de la Schara Planina en lui permetant de s’assurer 
le littoral serbo-albanais de l’Adriatique avec un hinterland suffisant et de remplir ainsi 
une condition essentielle de son indenpendance effective. — La renunciation au cours 
superieur du Wardar de la part de la Bulgarie serait largement compensée pqr des avan-
tages qui en resulteraient pour l’indenpendance balkanique  en général ainsi que pour 
sa proper sécurité.” Izvolsky was, however, not satisfied; he wanted something much 
more indefinite. Milovanović revised his draft and handed Izvolsky a new and much 
more moderate formula next day: “En se reservant d’examiner et de donner la juste 
et large satisfaction aux demandes de la Serbie, fondées tant sur les arguments d’ordre 
etnographique et historique que sur les besoins imperieux d’ordre économique, qui sont 
la condition essentielle de son independance et, par consequent de l’independance bal-
kanique en géneral.” See AS, Milovanović Papers, XVI/9, 13.
15 Toshev, Balkanskite voini, a report to Geshov 3–I, 1911, 298–300, 307–308. 
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and Pašić differed in terms of tactics: the former, in his own words, wanted 
to avoid “further detailed discussion of that dismal question now,” insisting 
that both sides eschew “stubborn preservation of prejudices no matter how 
deep-rooted”. While Milovanović was trying to smooth over those questions 
which could dampen the Bulgarian zeal, Pašić regarded such compliance as 
a consequence of the circumstances forcing King Ferdinand’s hand and he 
thus intended to make the best out of these favourable circumstances. On 
the other hand, the conciliatory and compromise-prone Milovanović made 
use of Pašić’s mood; he was more comfortable with the mediating role be-
tween Pašić and Rizov than dealing on his own with the Bulgarian delegate. 
Rizov gave his own assessment of the Serbian negotiators with whom he 
had met in Milovanović’s house on the night of 21–22 September 1911 and 
discussed the delimitation in Macedonia: “The most intransigent and per-
sistent was Pašić, the most approachable was Milovanović, whereas Ljuba 
Stojanović kept the middle course agreeing to make concessions in order to 
conclude an alliance”.16 It was Ljuba Stojanović who finally suggested, since 
Pašić and Rizov had failed to come to terms, that a straight line be drawn 
from Kratovo to Struga so as to give Veles and Prilep to Bulgaria while 
Kičevo and Poreč would belong to Serbia. Rizov rejected it; it was finally 
agreed to assign the entire region between the Šar and Rodopi Mountain to 
the arbitration of the Russian Emperor.17
Just like with Rizov, Milovanović tried to avoid conversations about 
the delimitation in Macedonia at his meeting with Goshev, the Bulgarian 
prime minister, on the train journey from Belgrade to Lapovo on 28 Sep-
tember.18 Geshov’s and Milovanović’s account tally in respect of Macedonia: 
16 Prilozhenie km tom prvi ot doklada na parlamentarnata izpitatelnata komisia, Sofia, 
1918, I, Interrogation of Rizov, 371 [hereafter Doklad].
17 Milovanović provided a detailed account of this meeting in his notes — AS, 
Milovanović Papers, XXVI/81–83; there is also some information in Die Internationalen 
Beziehungen im Zeitalten des Imperializmus — Documente aus den Archiven der zarichen 
und provisorischen Regierung 1888–1917, Reiche III, i, No 545, 563; Krasnyi Arhiv, Dip-
lomaticheska podgotovka balkanskoi voinyi1912, VIII, No 4, 7; Doklad I, no 1, 370/1. 
There are certain discrepancies in these reports. Rizov later claimed that the autonomy 
of Macedonia had been agreed on in principle and that the faith of Kičevo alone re-
mained in dispute while Veles, Prilep and Kruševo had been given to the Bulgarians. See 
Guechoff, L’alliance balkanique, 48–49. Milovanović did not mention it; he professed 
just the opposite in the frontier matters. 
18 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/87–94. The historiographical coverage of this meet-
ing has so far been based on Geshov (L’Alliance balkanique, 22–27), the only participant 
who published the content of conversations. The accounts of Poincare (Les Balkans en 
feu, Paris, 1926, 51–51) and Stanoje Stanojević (Srpsko-turski rat 1912, Belgrade, 1928, 
47–48) were based on his writing. There are also the second hand reports by Hartwig and 
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they both claimed there was no discussion of a partition. Geshov also wrote 
that Milovanović had mentioned the possibility of Austria-Hungary’s de-
mise which would simplify the delimitation issue: Serbia would have Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Romania would receive Transylvania. Milovanović 
did not mention that; indeed, it seems highly unlikely that he would refer 
to so uncertain, and according to him even unbelievable, contingency — the 
break-up of the Dual Monarchy. That would amount to providing argu-
ments against his own demands: to ask for a smaller piece of more-less cer-
tain in exchange for something larger but entirely uncertain. Milovanović 
was not so naive a negotiator. Geshov’s account was designed to serve its 
purpose — to keep King Ferdinand and the Bulgarian government in the 
favourable mood for an agreement.
  Pašić authorised Milovanović’s negotiations with Geshov. He was 
probably pleased with the fact that there was no talk of concrete delinea-
tion. Nevertheless, while Pašić, on one hand, gave assurances to Hartwig 
as to his full agreement,19 he was increasingly drawing back and distancing 
himself from Milovanović’s work, on the other. In early October 1911, Pašić 
almost demonstratively rejected a chairmanship of his Radicals’ club as well 
as presidency of the parliament. His behaviour suggested that something 
was brewing behind his peaceful exterior since the head of a ruling party 
was usually, in keeping with parliamentary practice, either prime minis-
ter or president of the National Assembly. There was a rumour among the 
Radicals, not without foundation, that Pašić “did not want to align himself 
with this political situation and preferred to have a free hand for some other 
[political] action”.20 There was also some talk about a new cabinet in which 
Pašić would take the place of Milovanović. However, such an act would 
bring about a split in the Radical Party. Pašić felt that and that was one of 
the reasons why he restrained himself from initiating a crisis. 
Nehljudov (Krasnyi arkhiv III, no 16, 32; Die Internationalen Beziehungen, III, No 696, 
589, 625). These reports are often inaccurate, for example that of Hartwig in which he 
mistook the vilayet of Salonica for the vilayet of Adrianople (Edirne) acknowledged by 
the Serbs as an indisputably Bulgarian territory. Hartwig also did not, perhaps inadvert-
ently, mention the division of Albania for which Milovanović had stood. Milovanović’s 
report makes clear the great extent to which Geshov was concerned about the attitude 
of Romania much discussed during the meeting.     
19 Die Internationalen Beziehungen, III, i, No 625; Krasnyi arkhiv VIII, no 16.
20 Politika, 15 October 1911.
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III
In the course of negotiations about the territorial delimitation with Bul-
garia in Macedonia Pašić and Milovanović stood and argued for two differ-
ent conceptions. The former’s view was that the delimitation issue should 
be postponed until the victory. It was sufficient to determine what is beyond 
dispute — up to the Šar and Rodopi Mountains — and the principle of 
division of Macedonia; the division itself would be carried out following a 
successful war and under supervision of the Russian Emperor. The latter’s 
view was that it should be the other way round: the borderline in Macedo-
nia, definite if possible, should be determined immediately. The arbitration 
of Russian Emperor would then be purely formal.
The first thesis was put forward by Rizov during his preliminary con-
versations in Belgrade in September. At first Milovanović hesitated. There 
was a good and a bad side to the proposition. If the details of delimitation 
were brushed aside, the making of an agreement would surely be easier for 
both sides. However, this uncertainty could induce both sides in case of a 
war to embark on conquering the contested regions with a view to making 
good their claims rather than throwing all their forces against the enemy. 
Before the Balkan Wars, there was little faith in the strength of the army in 
Serbia. Conflicts within officer corps, doubts regarding the quality of arma-
ment reflected in the bitter parliamentary debates formed the conviction 
that the Bulgarian army was better prepared than the Serbian army in both 
moral and material respect. To enter an uncertain situation with a stronger 
partner would mean to play a game against the better prepared player. That 
was the reason behind Milovanović’s initial hesitation. As it soon became 
apparent that there could be no compromise between Pašić’s and Bulgar-
ian stance, he accepted a partial solution which allowed him to procrasti-
nate as long as possible the dismal question of delimitation. When Rizov 
again broached this question at a meeting with Pašić, Milovanović had al-
ready accepted it and resisted only for the sake of appearance. He placed 
his hopes in Russia. Having obtained Izvolsky’s consent to revision of the 
San Stefano treaty and believing that Russia had had a debt to Serbia from 
the time of the Annexation Crisis, Milovanović was hopeful that he man-
aged to win over Russian diplomacy for the cause of Serbian pretensions 
in Macedonia.21 Therefore, he insisted on the absolute Russian arbitration 
at a meeting with Geshov and in his first draft of an alliance treaty sent to 
Sofia. It was not before the Bulgarian side declined to accept this procedure 
that Milovanović engaged himself in the detailed discussion concerning the 
prospective frontiers. 
21 AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/84. 
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True to his mistrustful nature, Pašić did not entirely share Milovanović’s 
confidence in Russia. For that reason, he immediately put forward maximal 
demands and put pressure on Milovanović to do the same. Pašić agreed to 
Russian arbitration at a meeting with Rizov so as not to incur the displeasure 
of Russia and because he was cornered due to the consent of other nego-
tiators; he did not see it as a substitute for his own frontier proposal. While 
Milovanović made his mind, under Bulgarian pressure, to enter detailed nego-
tiations, Pašić was getting closer to the idea of an absolute Russian arbitration 
for the simple reason that he realised he could not impose his own proposal 
for division — and he was not willing to renounce it. Both Milovanović and 
Pašić underwent evolution during the negotiations but it was in the opposite 
directions: the former was initially in favour of the absolute arbitration and 
in the end accepted the definite frontiers — in this case the arbitration was a 
sheer formality; the latter argued for the definite frontiers and then switched 
to the absolute Russian arbitration. This evolution was a natural consequence 
of their general attitude towards alliance with Bulgaria. Milovanović wanted 
the alliance at all costs and Pašić demanded maximal territorial gains in the 
south making the conclusion of an alliance conditional on that settlement. 
Unable to have his frontiers accepted, Pašić passed the decision for their 
abandonment on someone else — in this case the Russian arbiter.
IV
The first draft of an alliance treaty sent from Belgrade to Sofia was the fruit 
of Milovanović’s and Pašić’s common labour.22 The Bulgarian government 
was dissatisfied with it because it did not include the autonomy of Mace-
donia as a principle and it envisaged Russian arbitration over the entire 
area from the Šar to the Rodopi Mountains. The second draft produced by 
Milovanović and Pašić together partitioned the disputed territory of Mace-
donia in three zones: 1. the uncontested Serbian zone the borders of which 
were mostly those suggested by Ljuba Stojanović’s compromise proposal 
— a straight line from Kratovo to Ohrid; 2. the uncontested Bulgarian 
zone across the Bregalnica river and southwards from Prilep up to Ohrid; 
3. the contested zone in between which was to be the subject of Russian 
Emperor’s arbitration. This proposal seems to have been something of a 
compromise between Pašić’s and Milovanović’s views: Pašić’s border was 
moved northwards, from Prilep to Kičevo, but the Serbian minimal request 
22 Krasnyi arkhiv VIII, no 34, 43; Die Internationalen Beziehungen III, i, no 801; Doklad 
I, no 9. A detailed history of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations is beyond the scope 
of this work. These are touched upon only so far as they demonstrate the attitude of 
Milovanović and Pašić.   
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was now final and not subject to any later decision. This definiteness, in 
particular, upset the Sofia government. 
Aware of the powerful influence of Pašić, the Bulgarian government 
used the occasion of Milovanović’s trip in Paris in November to send Rizov 
after him in order to pressurise him further far away from the leader of the 
Radical Party. There is no doubt that Milovanović wavered in Paris. He did 
not put much of resistance. Rizov skilfully pleaded to him with a mixture of 
personal and general matters appealing to his common sense as much as his 
sentiments. “I swear on my fatherland and honour that this is our last at-
tempt to reach an agreement,” Rizov told Milovanović. “As your old friend 
I ask you and beg you to attach your name to this great accomplishment. 
Have courage, persevere and overcome all obstacles that even your political 
friends might throw in your way.”23 This fiery rant must have made great 
impression. Following the Parisian conversations Milovanović’s activities 
were marked by more energy and determination. 
On his return from Paris, Milovanović sent to the Bulgarian govern-
ment another proposal which envisaged an autonomous Macedonia and 
a new borderline in case the autonomy proved unviable with further con-
cession on the left bank of the Vardar river.24 The Bulgarian government 
responded with their own concessions moving the border from the Skoplje 
sanjak to the Serbian proposal of the frontier on the right bank of the Vard-
ar — an agreement was thus reached in this area. In return, the Bulgarians 
requested Kratovo and Kriva Palanka on the left bank of the Vardar.25 Ge-
shov begged Milovanović to accept this as the final Bulgarian proposal. 
Milovanović found himself in a difficult position hemmed in between 
the Bulgarians and Pašić. “With the full and deepest conviction,” he record-
ed, he was “willing to entirely accept the Bulgarian proposal”. At the same 
time, he was struggling as a typical bargainer: is the moment ripe for him to 
make concessions or is there more to be gained? Hartwig backed the Serbian 
side; Stepa Stepanović and the General Staff demanded Ovče Polje to which 
they attached great strategic importance. Therefore, Milovanović decided to 
make partial concessions rather than give in completely: Kriva Palanka and 
Kratovo would be given to Bulgarians but, in return, the frontier would run 
from the vicinity of Kratovo along the lines of the old Serbian border pro-
posal and extend over Ovče Polje to the Ohrid lake. This compromise gave 
away Kratovo and Kriva Palanka, and kept part of Ovče Polje.
23 Guechoff, L’Alliance balkanique, 51. 
24 The watershed Pčinja–Kriva Reka–Bregalnica with the borderline reaching the Vard-
ar below the confluence of Pčinja rather than the confluence of Bregalnica. 
25 The Bulgarian proposal was: the watershed of the Pčnja and Kriva Reka and then 
along the Pčinja from the confluence of Kriva Reka up to the Vardar. 
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Not capable of maintaining the fight on two fronts, at home and 
abroad, Milovanović decided to force the issue with Pašić. In mid-December 
1911, he convened a council consisting of Radicals, Independent Radicals 
and army officers to lay down his personal opinion, find out what was the 
dominant attitude towards the problem at hand and share the responsibility 
for further concessions to Bulgarians. 
At this meeting, Milovanović underscored that the events did not 
allow any procrastination. “My conviction has always been that a Serbo-
Bulgarian community is the first and the most important condition for both 
our and their future. Today more than ever I see no other way in which our 
independence as a state and further accomplishment of our national ideals 
could be secured”. Bulgaria sought for agreement at the time, Russia made 
effort to facilitate it, the circumstances were favourable. It was a distrust in 
King Ferdinand alone that militated against the alliance. But that was a per-
manent reason and anyone who wanted an agreement with Bulgaria would 
have to take it into account. “We want and must want an alliance because 
there is no substitute for it. If Ferdinand is dishonest, he will cheat not just 
Serbia, but also Russia. We must hurry because we do not know what the 
spring will bring about and, in case of a crisis in the Balkans, we cannot 
remain in the open — not secured either from Bulgarian or Austro-Hun-
garian side. An Albanian revolution will bring Austro-Hungary in the Novi 
Pazar sanjak. Serbia cannot resist such contingency without an agreement 
with Bulgaria. Finally, Serbia might be compelled to force the issue herself 
as soon as European constellation allows it because the Serbian population 
is being systematically exterminated in Old Serbia, and Kosovo is the cen-
tral position of the Serbdom. Our relations with [Ottoman] Turkey become 
increasingly pointless and even dangerous for us. They have served us well 
as a means of drawing closer Bulgaria, but the Turks blackmail us now — 
they threaten to take a favourable view of the Bulgarians again as soon 
as we raise our voice for the protection of our compatriots. After all, the 
Bulgarians could seek protection in an agreement with Austria-Hungary if 
they do not find us forthcoming, which would be bad for them but fatal for 
us”. Concluding his report, Milovanović suggested that Kratovo and Kriva 
Palanka be abandoned and stated that he could not accept the responsibil-
ity for the breakdown of the negotiations in the existing circumstances. In 
other words, he was prepared to resign.
After having been asked first for his views, Ljuba Stojanović refused 
to express his opinion: it was for the government, and not the opposition, 
he said, to conduct policy. Milovanović was supposed, being a foreign min-
ister, to make a decision by himself. Stojanović was actually in agreement 
with Milovanović and he said him as much in private after the meeting had 
been concluded. He encouraged Milovanović to persevere and overpow-
er Pašić supporting his intention to resign if the latter continued to put a 
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spoke in his wheel. Other participants in the meeting did not shed any more 
light. Pointing out his exclusively military point of view, Stepa Stepanović 
stressed the strategic importance of Ovče Polje. Stojanović replied to him 
that in case of a war with Bulgaria the outcome will be decided in the direc-
tion Niš–Sofia and not Ćustendil–Skoplje. Andra Nikolić and Stojan Protić 
were inclined towards Milovanović’s view, but they were reluctant to openly 
state their opinion out of consideration for Pašić. 
Pašić finally spoke as well. He made a clear and open stand against 
further concessions. He even disputed Milovanović’s last offer which re-
nounced a part of Ovče Polje and fell back to his initial proposal for the 
frontier on the Bregalnica river made to Rizov at the beginning of the nego-
tiations. Pašić reverted to the starting point: lets have both proposals — the 
Serbian and the Bulgarian — going to the arbitration of Russian Emperor. 
He categorically professed that he “does not consent to the amputation of 
Serbian nation” given that the indisputably Serbian lands were about to 
be given to Bulgarians. Pašić argued that Kratovo and Kriva Palanka were 
Serbian areas and claimed that he could bet on his life he would be able to 
gain these two towns for Serbia.
Pašić did not dispute Milovanović’s assessment of the general situa-
tion — Serbia was in a difficult position and the faithful days were ahead. 
But he refuted Milovanović’s thesis that an agreement with Bulgaria was 
the only way out of predicament. If that agreement proved impossible to 
reach, Pašić proposed another combination: to win over the Albanians and 
form joint Serbo-Albanian units which would, according to him, put an 
end to Albanian atrocities in Old Serbia, create a dam against Austria-
Hungary and protect Serbian interests in Macedonia against Bulgaria. Pašić 
remained intransigent and met Milovanović’s argument to the effect that 
Serbia could not withstand a two-front fighting with the remark that it was 
better to wait than to cede Kriva Palanka. 
Having seen that Pašić could not be dissuaded, Milovanović stuck to 
his guns as well and paid a visit to Hartwig immediately after the meeting. 
He received full support from the Russian minister, enthusiastic about the 
Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, and also a promise of Russia’s intervention in 
Sofia. Without hesitation and firm in his decision to proceed at his own 
risk, Milovanović sent instructions to Spalajković on 15 December to make 
concessions regarding Kratovo and Kriva Palanka.26 From that moment on-
wards Milovanović worked on his own without consulting Pašić.27   
26 A note on this meeting is in AS, Milovanović Papers, XXVI/96–102; the instructions 
for Spalajković can be found in Krasnyi arkhiv IX, No 65.
27 There is also the account of Milan Gavrilović, Pašić’s secretary, on the events on the 
eve of the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance which was drawn upon in E. C. Helmre-
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Pašić did not fail to inform Hartwig about his stance making it clear 
that he was opposed to any further concessions and that Milovanović was 
working on his own.28 His attitude was also known in Sofia. Nehljudov, 
the Russian minister to Bulgaria, accused him overtly in St. Petersburg of 
not wanting an agreement and pointed out the danger of Pašić’s under-
mining Milovanović’s efforts.29 Such an attitude on the part of Pašić no 
doubt influenced the Bulgarian government not to press too hard. It also 
induced Russian diplomacy to back the Serbian desiderata more firmly so 
that Pašić’s view would not prevail and the negotiations as a whole come 
into question.
Pašić intervened in the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations one more time 
in January 1912 when Struga, which the Bulgarian government had previ-
ously ceded to Serbia, suddenly became a matter of contention. The agitated 
Pašić went straight to Hartwig and expounded that the Bulgarian request 
was absolutely inacceptable.30 In the matter of Struga, Pašić was, just like 
Milovanović, frightened of the behaviour of the Russian military attaché 
in Sofia, Colonel Romanovsky, who interfered with the dispute and sug-
gested his own frontier proposal. “The Romanovsky line” was dangerous 
ich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913 (Cambridge 1938), 58–59. Just like 
Milovanović, Gavrilović also did not specify the exact date of the meeting he referred 
to. Perhaps it was the same meeting, although there are considerable differences in the 
two records. Milovanović’s notes make it clear that the meeting was held before 15 
December 1911; his notes are entirely credible and written immediately after the event. 
Citing Gavrilović, Helmreich has mentioned a memorandum distributed to the partici-
pants at the conference — Pašić allegedly wrote down his objections on that document. 
Unfortunately, that document has not survived and Gavrilović laid it out from memory. 
According to Gavrilović, Milovanović convened a conference between the leaders of 
Serbian parties in order to consult them about the conclusion of an alliance. He justi-
fied major concessions made to Bulgarians by their assistance against Austria. All the 
participants except Pašić agreed — he was silent and simply remarked that Milovanović 
was foreign minister who had to make a decision. Having been asked later about his at-
titude on this occasion, Pašić pointed out too great concessions made to Bulgarians and 
his suspicion concerning their help against Austria. He was convinced that Ferdinand 
would never act against the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, he suspected that the Bulgarian 
King would inform Vienna about what was going on. Finally, Pašić himself spoke of the 
Bulgarian alliance at the Radicals’ conference in Belgrade in 1920; he referred to the 
meeting of the Crown Council under King Petar’s chairmanship during which he had 
said in the presence of Radicals’ and Independent Radicals’ leaders that “the royal gov-
ernment went further in making concessions to Bulgaria than our interests required…” 
See Spomenica Nikole Pašića povodom desetogodišnjice smrti (Belgrade 1937), 203–204.     
28 Krasnyi arkhiv IX, no. 66. 
29 Ibid. IX, no. 69, 70.
30 Ibid. IX, no. 71. 
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as it prejudiced the Russian arbitration. Milovanović and Pašić opposed it 
together. They parted ways soon again when Milovanović, in order to have 
his treaty, ceded this town on the Ohrid lake to Bulgarians.
V
The contemporaries differed in their assessment of Pašić’s conduct in 1911–
1912: Milovanović, Rizov and Geshov held one opinion and Splajković was 
of different mind. According to the former opinion, Pašić wanted to do 
away with the accusations of him being a Bulgarian and Bugarophile which 
had haunted him since the time of the Timok Rebellion, the Radicals-in-
spired peasant uprising against King Milan Obrenović and conscription 
in Eastern Serbia in 1883. Basically, he was in agreement with the work 
of the Serbian government but, not being a member of the cabinet, could 
allow himself to criticise. According to the latter opinion, Pašić purposely 
obstructed any attempt at rapprochement with Bulgaria which was not car-
ried out under his personal control and authority. 
Both opinions were well-founded to some extent. His alleged pro-
Bulgarian stance and his ambiguous conduct before the marshal court in 
connection with the  1883 Timok Rebellion had been a major hindrance 
in Pašić’s political life. He was known as a politician prone to undermining 
his own party’s government as long as he was not a member of it — the 
case in point was Vujić’s cabinet in 1902. Nevertheless, these reasons were 
not the main ones. The issue was not so simple. There were two features in 
Pašić’s conduct during the negotiations both of which implied the refusal of 
concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia. Pašić first demanded the Bregalnica 
frontier and then proposed the arbitration of Russian Emperor between 
the requests of Serbia and Bulgaria; it was not before Milovanović refused 
it under Bulgarian pressure that Pašić wanted a breakdown of the negotia-
tions or their procrastination. The essential in Pašić’s manoeuvring was that 
he accepted an agreement with Bulgaria in principle but did not allow the 
Serbian government to voluntarily attach its signature on a borderline that 
he found unfavourable. Having been told by Milovanović that the Russian 
Emperor would at best decide along the lines of the Serbo-Bulgarian fron-
tier agreement, Pašić replied: “Well, let it be so!” His unspoken intention 
was to have the Serbian government, if must be, accept a borderline for the 
sake of an agreement with Bulgaria under duress, because of the imperial 
ruling which could not be disputed, rather than on its own volition. 
Hartwig justified Pašić’s behaviour in St. Petersburg on account of 
his greater responsibility as the head of the party that that of Milovanović.31 
31 Ibid. IX, no. 74. 
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Given the very strong nationalist feeling in Serbia, even more pronounced 
due to the comitadji activities and the fighting against the Bulgarian ir-
regulars in Macedonia, Milovanović’s conciliatoriness was bound, once it 
was made known, to cause stir of protest among parties and politicians in 
Serbia. From 1903 onwards, the entire Serbian nationalist press vehemently 
campaigned for the annexation of Slaavic Macedonia to Serbia referring to 
the Emperor Dušan’s lands and the medieval Serbian state. It was rather 
predictable that the borderline envisaged in the 1912 alliance treaty would 
face damnation from the nationalist circles in Serbia. In addition, Pašić 
himself shared such views and gave them direction. His opposition and 
reserve during the negotiations with Bulgaria stemmed from his personal 
conviction and the fear of reactions from the nationalist current.  
When the content of the agreement became known, the dissatisfac-
tion predicted by Pašić erupted. Crown Prince Aleksandar openly stated his 
disagreement and bewilderment at the negotiated border.32 Unaware of the 
conclusion of the alliance until the outbreak of war, Novaković was mark-
edly dissatisfied when he found out about “the contested zone”.33 Ribarac 
and the Marinković brothers were also against the contracted borders.34 Jo-
van Cvijić refuted in the newspapers35 the rumours to the effect that he had 
suggested the Serbo-Bulgarian borderline in Macedonia; he even claimed 
to have protested against this frontier in a letter to “a distinguished person” 
prior to the signing of the alliance treaty.36 The frontier suggestions sent to 
Bulgarians (the watershed Pčinja-Bregalnica and the line which left out 
32 Milos Bogitschewitsch, Kriegsursachen (Zurich 1919), 35. Cemović claimed that 
Crown Prince had promised him, while the negotiations were still underway, that he 
would wrack such a treaty through his activities in St. Petersburg. Cemović also pro-
vided additional information on Pašić’s conduct but these have to be taken with a pinch 
of salt on account of his bitterness and strong qualifications. Cf. Cemović, “Srpsko-
bugarski ugovor 1912”, Politika, 1 August 1925; “Zavera” protiv g. N. Pašića”, Pravda, 
25 July 1925; “Izvrtanje istorije i istine”, Politika, 2 September 1925; Djurdje Jelenić, 
“Nikola Pašić i srpsko-bugarski spor 1913”, Politika, 31 August 1925).  
33 Jovan Jovanović, Novaković u diplomatiji, 217. Novaković learnt about the terms of 
the alliance just prior to his departure for the Conference of Ambassadors in London. 
See Dimitrije Djordjević, “Kako su velike sile saznale za sklapanje Balkanskog saveza 
1912?”, Istorijski glasnik 4 (1954), 132. 
34 Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine [Stenographic Record of Proceedings, The 
National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbia], 32nd regular session, 16 May 1913, 
525. 
35 Štampa, 20 January 1913. 
36 Cvijić took part in the first phase alone. He drew the delimitation map — Bregalnica, 
Demir Kapija — which Milovanović  handed to Izvolsky in St. Petersburg in 1910. See 
AS, Milovanović Papers, XVI/35.     
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Kratovo and Kriva Palanka) were in fact made, under Milovanović’s instruc-
tions, by two soldiers: General Staff Lieutenant-Colonel Živko Pavlović 
and General Staff Major Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis.37 This co-operation 
was made possible by Milovanović’s connections with the “Unification or 
Death” (Black Hand) organisation. The organisation was familiar with the 
course of negotiations through Apis and Bogdan Radenković. It should be 
noted that the two of them fully supported Milovanović’s work although 
they were extreme nationalists. The “Unification or Death” organisation 
considered the victory over the Ottoman Empire the foremost objective 
of the alliance. Everything else was subordinated to that goal. In respect of 
the territorial delimitation with Bulgaria, the only condition was an outlet 
to the Adriatic Sea and the secured right bank of the Vardar River. The 
prevalent opinion in the organisation was that “the size of the territory to 
be allotted to Bulgaria should not be turned into a major issue since the uni-
fication between the Serbs and Bulgarians must inevitably come to pass”.38 
There was more fear of the Albanians than the Bulgarians. The backing of 
the organisation and the support of Independent Radicals perfectly played 
into Milovanović’s hands to overcome Pašić’s opposition. 
VI
Finally, all this begs the question: why did not Pašić oust Milovanović dur-
ing the negotiations since he disagreed with his work? Pašić partially an-
swered this question himself after the First World War when he contended 
that “the treaty had to be accepted as Bulgaria would otherwise relieve her-
self from the responsibility before Russia which facilitated the conclusion 
of the agreement”.39 Russia was too much involved in the Serbo-Bulgarian 
negotiations to take their breakdown lightly. In addition, Pašić realised the 
seriousness of situation in which Serbia found herself, particularly after the 
outbreak of the 1911 Italo-Turkish War. All the reasons that Milovanović 
advanced in favour of the agreement were too apparent for Pašić to oppose. 
His combinations with the Albanians could be the last and desperate resort 
in case the efforts for the conclusion of an agreement with Bulgaria failed, 
but they could not substitute for the Bulgarian alliance. Finally, the removal 
of Milovanović, which could have been effected, was bound to open a se-
vere political crisis in Serbia. Milovanović had the backing of Independent 
Radicals and army officers as well as some Radicals. His elimination would 
37 Ibid.,XXVI/95. 
38 Čeda Popović, “Srpsko-bugarski rat 1913”, Nova Evropa 10–11 (1928), 313. 
39 Speech at the conference of the Radical Party in 1920, Spomenica Nikole Pašića, 204. 
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not just bring about a rift in the Radical Party, but also turn all other par-
ties against Pašić. In principle, a Bulgarian alliance against Ottomans was 
extremely popular in Serbia; after all, the Radicals themselves had been 
propagating it for quite some time. The same people who threw a stone on 
Milovanović, once they found out about the contracted frontiers, would 
turn against Pašić if he tried to disrupt the alliance at the time of its forma-
tion. Had Pašić brought Milovanović down, he would have found himself 
in a difficult position: either to break with the Bulgarians which would have 
drawn the wrath of Russia and Serbian public on his head or to continue 
the negotiations following in Milovanović’s steps as the agreement could 
not be concluded otherwise? Fearing to plump for any alternative, Pašić 
resorted to half-measures: without taking responsibility for abolishing the 
agreement he stepped back and presented formal rather than real opposi-
tion — not strong enough to topple Milovanović or loud enough to put his 
disagreement on record.
Such behaviour on the part of Pašić was particularly conspicuous fol-
lowing Milovanović’s death in June 1912. The entire public in Serbia ex-
pected the leader of the Radical Party to form a cabinet. Instead, Marko 
Trifković did it and Jovan  M. Jovanović became a foreign minister in his 
cabinet. Pašić who had struggled to come into office all his life now re-
nounced the premiership on his own volition and left for Marienbad as soon 
as the parliamentary crisis was resolved.40 Pašić’s taking over the govern-
ment was expected not just in Serbia, but also in Bulgaria; Geshov and King 
Ferdinand sent messages though Spalajković to King Petar in that sense.41 
However, it was not before mid-September 1912, on the eve of the war, that 
Pašić made the final decision and took the matters in his own hands.
VII
The divergence between Pašić and Milovanović in 1912 was rather practi-
cal than a matter of principle. Their disagreement was the consequence of 
their differing estimate of the relation between the extent of concessions 
and the benefits of alliance. Both Pašić and Milovanović had certain argu-
ments to explain their conduct. Pašić believed that the alliance treaty was 
unfavourable for Serbia: its terms put in question even the territory from 
the Šar Mountain to Struga and Pčinja whereas Bulgaria was going to re-
ceive the somewhat revised San Stefano borders and emerge in the entire 
40 This strange outcome of the crisis was duly noted not just in Serbia, but also abroad. 
See Redlich, Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908–1919 (Vienna 1953), vol. I, 169. 
41 Miroslav Spalajković, “Kralj Petar i bugarski kralj Ferdinand”, Politika, 6 January 
1941. 
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area as Serbia’s southern neighbour. The direction of Serbia’s expansion was 
channelled towards the Adriatic Sea over the mountainous and hostile Al-
bania. On the other hand, Milovanović’s assessment that Serbia could not 
endure the conflict with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria at the same time 
was a foregone conclusion. Peace was possible with the latter, and not the 
former, country and it was necessary to pay a certain price in order to have 
it. “If it had been possible to ask for all that was wanted,” Marko Trifunović 
professed in defence of Milovanović in the parliament, “the alliance would 
not have been concluded”.42 The Serbo-Bulgarian alliance treaty of 1912 no 
doubt played a valuable role in the historical development of the Balkan na-
tions and served as a starting point for the great events that followed.
With his diplomatic elasticity, broad horizons and willingness to meet 
the Bulgarians more than half way for the sake of agreement Milovanović 
was instrumental to the conclusion of the alliance in the circumstances of 
1911–1912. He carried out the negotiations with Bulgaria mostly on his 
own showing determination, energy and the clear vision of a goal. “With 
a clear conscience and full conviction I can state that I have done all that 
could be done for a favourable solution,” he wrote down just before the 
signing of the treaty. The fact that the Balkan Alliance of 1912 rested on the 
shaky ground and was rooted in the then political constellation rather than 
profound transformation of mind in the two countries was neither his nor 
Pašić’s fault. In any case, the compromise-prone Milovanović was certainly 
not an exponent of Serbian nationalism which fully blossomed prior to the 
Balkan Wars. The marked bearer of this trend in the Serbian society was and 
remained Pašić. 
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